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Народ, который не готов умереть за свою свободу, утрачивает её. Андре Моруа (1885-1967), французский писатель


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Яндекс цитирования


28.03.2024, четверг. Московское время 11:50


ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ

Overview

Every person involved in the conduct of elections is concerned with the need for absolute security and accountability of the ballots. Secure, transparent and efficient election administration, including the production and handling of the ballots, is important to insure public trust in the process. Specific guidelines must be followed to guarantee complete accountability in the printing of paper ballots and the ballot production process. These guidelines affect everything from the manufacturing of the paper to the packaging of the final printed product. Although the guidelines presented in this paper are derived primarily from the California Election Code, California Administrative Code and county and state election procedures, they are also common to other states and jurisdictions throughout the world.

This paper will address the following issues pertaining to paper ballot security and accountability:

    Watermarked Paper or Use of Graphic Design

    Printing of Ballots According to Specific Regulations and Format

    Development of Ballot Types, Serial Numbers and Use Codes Perforating, Binding and Packaging the Ballots

    Accountability and Distribution

By codifying the guidelines, the printing process becomes more transparent. The public is able to follow the entire printing operation by reading the required specifications, inspecting records which identify and designate the distribution of ballots, and observing the checking of ballots for serial number sequence and ballot type at any distribution level. Adding serial numbers overprinted onto the ballot stubs increases accountability and simplifies reconciliation of ballots at the polls, thereby improving accuracy and speeding up the closing process. Although printing paper ballots according to the following guidelines will likely increase ballot production costs over current practices, money will also be saved because the process of counting and reconciling ballots will be simplified and there will never be a need to reprint an entire batch of ballots should any become lost or disappear.

Finally, as higher standards for the ballot production are implemented, the ballots become more difficult to counterfeit and look more official. The sanctity of the ballot will be enhanced and the public's trust in the electoral process will increase.

    See Attachment A: Sample Paper Ballot

Watermarked Paper Or Use Of Graphic Design1

Ballot security begins with the paper used. A good quality watermarked paper provides the best security from counterfeiting. Codification of paper manufacturing, storage and destruction simplifies ballot paper production and insures standardization at all elections. It also enhances public trust as the product looks official.

The Electoral Authority should designate a specific paper manufacturing company for paper production. Measures for the storage of paper prior to the printing of the ballots should be specified. Procedures for the destruction of unused paper and the time for the destruction should also be indicated.

The Electoral Authority should specify the type of watermark at the time of production. The use of tint and graphic design provides a less costly alternative to the security provided by watermarked paper. This specific coloring and design should be printed or overprinted onto ordinary paper and also discourages the counterfeiting of ballots.

The Secretary of State of California, for instance, selects one tint and design from an approved list of colors and graphics at each election. No two sequential elections will use the same graphic design. Such designs include the state flag; state flower, state outline, state capitol dome, etc.

    See Attachment B: Samples of graphic overprinting. The samples are printed on unfinished punch card ballot stock rather than paper but the result is the same.

    See Attachment C: Excerpts from the California State Administrative Code which deal with paper production and ballot security.

Printing Of Ballots According To Specific Regulations And Format

The Subject should codify ballot printing regulations to include ballot format, type style and point size, perforations, ruling and point size for rules, ballot title format, size of voting squares, etc. The type of voter instructions printed on the ballot for any given election should also be defined. For instance, different procedures for marking the ballot may be required for local-level and for subject-level elections, or for an election involving candidates conducted simultaneously with a referendum.

The codification of regulations insures consistency in all elections and referenda and improves public trust by insuring the transparency of the ballot production process.

    See Attachment D: California State Election Code printing specifications.

Developing Ballot Types, Serial Numbers And Use Codes

The easiest way to insure ballot security is through the use of (a) ballot types, which identify the different kinds of ballots; (b) sequential serial numbers, which provide tractability; and (c) specific use codes, which designate where and how the ballot is to be issued and voted. These numbers and codes are printed as a part of the ballot itself or overprinted onto the ballot using a numbering device.

Serial number sequences, ballot types and use codes should be determined by the Electoral Authority prior to the printing of the ballots.

While the serial numbers provide administrative accountability for the total number of ballots issued, there is no way to trace a ballot back to the voter since the stubs are detached prior to the voted ballot being placed in the ballot box. Thus, the secrecy of the ballot is maintained as the serial numbers appear only on the ballot stubs, not on the ballot itself.

Ballot Types

Ballot types are used to distinguish each specific kind of ballot in elections where there are different races and/or measures presented to the voters in various districts, cities or territories.

For example, in a subject-wide election where territorial issues create seven (7) different types of ballots, the ballots could be distinguished by using seven (7) numerical ballot types. These ballot types could be numbered 01 through 07 respectively. The numbers could be assigned at the time the ballot format is developed, in accordance with the candidates and measures to be presented to voters on each specific ballot. This provides immediate identification of a ballot without the need to search headings.

The ballot types may be included on the ballot in one of two ways. They may either be overprinted onto the ballot after printing process is completed, or they may be included in the ballot format along with the candidates and issues which would eliminate the extra step of the overprint.

Serial Number Sequence

The overprinting of a serial number sequence onto all ballots insures tractability as the ballots may then be assigned to specific polling places by number. The actual selection and imprinting of serial numbers is discussed in detail later in this section.

A permanent distribution record should also be created for total accountability. For example, if 5000 ballots, representing two (2) different ballot types as discussed above, are to be equally distributed to five (5) different polling places and the selected serial number sequence is 00001 through 05000, the written record in Table I will show which polling place received which sequential set of ballots.

Table I Sample Distribution of Ballots

Poll

Ballot Type

Serial Number Sequence

A

01

00001 - 01000

B

01

01001 - 02000

C

02

02001 - 03000

D

02

03001 - 04000

E

02

04001 - 05000

A designated recipient should sign for ballots received at each level of distribution. The receipt should indicate the serial number sequence, and ballot type thus providing complete accountability. (See «Accountability and Distribution.»)

Should any ballots disappear or be lost, their replacement becomes a simple matter. Missing ballots may be identified by their serial numbers, the loss noted in a master file, a new set of ballots issued and the new serial numbers recorded as replacements. Selected serial numbers may also indicate different ballot uses which is addressed below.

Use Codes

Use codes can identify and differentiate between ballots used at the polls, early voting ballots and mobile balloting. A use code simply consists of a group of letters proceeding the numerical ballot type.

Using the example in the table above, polling place ballots are assigned ballot types 01 and 02. Early voting ballots could be coded as EV01 and EV02, while ballots used at mobile stations could carry a code of MS01 and MS02. Instead of, or in addition to, use codes, the first digit of a serial number sequence can be selected to identify the specific use of the ballot . Table II shows how the numbers 0, 5 and 9 can specified to identify the use of various ballots (i.e., as a poll ballot, early voting ballot, or mobile station ballot).

Table II Identifying Ballot Use By Serial Number

Beginning Serial Number

Use of the Ballot

000001

Poll Ballots

500001

Early Voting Ballots

900001

Mobile Station Ballots

By using such codes and/or identifying numerical digits, both the accountability and the public trust is enhanced. The secrecy of all ballots is maintained because although the use code and ballot type appear on the voted ballot for identification purposes, the serial numbers which might tie the ballot to the voter do not.

Overprinting Ballot Type, Serial Numbers and Use Codes onto the Ballot According to Ballot Specifications

For maximum accountability, a paper ballot should consist of three parts: (a) a top stub which serves as an administrative tool for record keeping, (b) a second stub which serves as a voters receipt of participation in the democratic process, and (c) the ballot itself. The three parts should be separated by perforations for easy removal.

Codes and numbers should be overprinted onto the ballots in specified preassigned areas. These areas should be designated on the ballot specifications developed at the time the ballots are prepared for printing. As mentioned earlier, the ballot type may be printed as a part of the ballot rather than through a second step of overprinting.

The Electoral Authority should prepare ballot specification worksheets for the printer. These should be used as a guide for finishing the printed ballot, indicating where the ballot type, serial numbers and use codes are to be placed. They should also show stub size and location of perforations. (See «Perforating, Binding and Packaging the Ballots.») Ballot specifications should also provide information on the number of digits to be contained in the serial number sequence and, if the numbers are to identify different ballot uses, they should indicate the selected numerical series as well. The ballot specifications are usually drawn up at the time the ballot format is finalized, providing the printer with complete information on how to finish the process once the ballots are printed.

    See Attachment E: Samples of ballot specification worksheets

Perforating, Binding And Packaging The Ballots

After the ballots are printed and the ballot types and codes have been printed or overprinted onto them, they are ready for perforating, binding and packaging. Perforation may also be done at the time of printing, depending on equipment capabilities.

Ballots are perforated to assist in their removal from the pad and to allow easy removal of the voter's receipt stub. The perforation areas should also be designated on the ballot specifications (see above and Attachment E). As mentioned previously, the serial number, printed on the voter's receipt stub and on the top administrative stub, can not be traced to the voter.

After perforation, the ballots should be bound in easily transportable pads, in serial number sequence, according to ballot type. In California and many other U.S. States the ballots are bound in pads of 50 to facilitate issuance by the poll workers and for ease of reconciliation. The number of ballots to be bound in a pad should also be included on the ballot specifications.

Ballots may be packaged in a variety of ways for security. The pads many be shrink-wrapped and labeled by poll for optimum accountability and security. Binding a group of pads together with string and affixing a wax seal provides similar security. However packaged, the ballots should be identified by poll, ballot type and/or use code, and serial number sequence. This enables easy handling and verification of the ballots and provides accountability which will also promote public trust in the process.

A complete ballot distribution record should be kept by the Electoral Authority. The various local jurisdictions should receive a similar record pertaining to their specific ballot types and serial numbers. In case ballot replacement becomes necessary, it is an easy task to assign a new number sequence of the appropriate ballot type and to record the loss or disappearance of the originals. There is never a need to expend large sums of money to reprint the entire batch of ballots.

Accountability And Distribution

As discussed above, a record of ballot distribution can be developed for use at all levels of government. These records will provide 100% accountability for the printed ballots and should include complete distribution information. A designated person should sign for the ballots, upon receipt, at each level of distribution. (See Attachment F.)

The Electoral Authority should distribute ballots to the local areas. Each local designee should sign for their respective ballots, redistributing the ballots to the various poll designees who should also sign for their specific ballots.

Ballots should be inspected at each level of delivery to insure the ballot type and serial number sequences are as specified on the record of ballot distribution and on the labels.

At the close of the polls, ballots must be accounted for in accordance with prescribed election law. All stubs from pads of ballots which have been completely issued should be returned with the unused full and partial ballot pads thus providing a complete record of accounting for the ballots.

Because the ballots are overprinted with sequential serial numbers and bound in pads, the ballot reconciliation process is greatly simplified, improving both speed and accuracy.

    See Attachment F: Sample receipt for ballots received

Conclusion

Ballot accountability, security and public trust are three requirements which need to be addressed by officials conducting elections. To achieve these objectives, paper ballots should be provided which:

    Are printed to exact specifications, on watermarked paper or with a tint and graphic design for protection from counterfeiting

    Include ballot types, use codes and sequential serial numbers printed or overprinted onto the ballot for complete accountability

    Are bound and packaged for easy distribution

Officials should guarantee that these three requirements are met in the most cost effective manner possible by following the above safeguards. Following these safeguards will also insure the transparency of the ballot printing process.

As noted earlier, although following the above safeguards may increase the cost, the use of watermarks or graphic designs actually save money by precluding any need for reprinting the total batch of ballots and increasing the efficiency of the process. Public trust is also enhanced because the ballots are look more professional and credible and are difficult to counterfeit.

Serial number sequences overprinted onto the ballot provide ballot security and tractability while insuring the secrecy of the voted ballot, as the serial numbers appear only on the stubs and can never be traced back to a specific voter.

Current law may need to be revised to insure ballot security and accountability. New forms and procedures may need to be developed to provide quality control. By adopting measures based on the above guidelines, the electoral process would be upgraded and enhanced.

Attachments

Attachment A. Sample Paper Ballot

Attachment B. Samples of Graphic Overprinting

Attachment C. California State Administrative Code (Excerpts regarding Manufacturing, Storage and Security of Ballot Paper)

Attachment D. California State Election Code (Excerpts regarding Ballot Printing Specifications)

Attachment E. Samples of Ballot Specification Worksheets

EXPLANATION

Attached are samples of ballot specifications which a printer would use as a guide for finishing the printed ballots.

They provide the specifics needed for perforating the ballots, overprinting consecutive serial numbers onto the ballots and other general information.

A ballot specifications form is usually created from a pre-printed form with a photocopy of the final approved ballot format affixed.

A member of the ballot drafting team should complete the specific information regarding ballot type, use codes, serial numbers and perforations by writing them onto the specifications form and onto the ballot affixed to the form.

The form should be pre-printed for the continuity of general information such as type of election, number of digits to be used in the sequential numbering, beginning serial number, need for ballot type overprint, use code specifications, number of ballots to be bound in a pad, etc.

If use codes, for ballot differentiation, are to be overprinted, a different ballot specifications form is used for each type of code. In the attached examples, the author has prepared three (3) forms, one for poll ballots and the other two for early voting ballots and mobile station ballots respectively.

The ballot samples drawn by the author are based primarily on California Election Code requirements. They have been slightly amended to provide space for the signatures of the poll officials, which are often required in many countries. The ballots have been reduced to 70% of their original size.

Attachment F. Sample Receipts for Ballots Received for a Poll


1 Original samples of watermarked paper and graphic overprinting may be viewed at the IFES/Moscow Election Resource Center.

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